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Abstract
Smart City infrastructures require contracts between
public and private organizations collaborating in what
is frequently referred to as fog computing platforms.
We investigate contract provision variations from
different stakeholder perspectives. Our methodology
relies on complex adaptive systems theory, and we
simulate different contract provision scenarios to
identify patterns that emerge. The specific contract
provisions we investigate in this paper are related to
analytical model and data ownership paradigm
variations.
We find that some variations offer
advantages to stakeholders that include those who
participate in the smart city fog platform and those
who may have ownership of smart city fog platform
infrastructure.

1. Introduction
Fog computing is a highly virtualized platform that
provides compute, storage and networking services
between end devices and traditional cloud computing
data centers. [1] The fog is envisioned to provide a
number of extensions to the cloud paradigm including:
1) The fog targets the large scale distribution of data,
analytics and smart devices connected through a
network with rich services located at endpoints, 2)
Endpoints are assumed to be a large number of
geographically dispersed, mainly wireless devices that
engage in real-time interactions and 3) Fog
applications of analytics and big data require collectors
at the edge to gather data (e.g., from mobile devices),
provide semi-permanent storage facilities, deploy
analytical models, and they have links to a cloud
computing infrastructure where longer term storage,
platform-level management and data mining can be
efficiently performed.
Fog computing is a natural space for Internet of
Things (IoT) applications. By bridging IoT and the
cloud, fog computing takes on the tasks and roles for
which cloud computing has not typically been
deployed. For example, proprietary devices such as
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those common to Smart City applications don’t
normally exist in cloud infrastructure, but niche
players in IoT for Smart City applications are
envisioned as serving a major role in the fog. There
are a variety of definitions for the phrase ‘Smart
City,’ but they almost always include some reference
to IoT. Most definitions center on increasing
urbanization, the types of problems and issues that
arise in the dynamic of large population centers and
the realization that such places can have serious
problems in areas like traffic congestion, healthcare
delivery, sustainability, deteriorating infrastructure,
etc. [2]. For example, Ojo, Curry, et al. [3] find:
1. Smart City programs generally leverage physical
infrastructure,
information
communication
technologies, knowledge resources and social
infrastructure to address economic regeneration,
greater social cohesion, better city administration
and improved infrastructure management, and
2. Smart City initiatives typically involve an
interplay
of
technology,
policy
and
organizational innovation that is shaped by and
impact external factors like people, communities,
the economy, built infrastructure, the natural
environment and governance.
Several Smart City programs are ongoing in
countries including Portugal, Brazil, United Arab
Emirates, Korea, Japan, the USA and many others.
Most are considering or have addressed Open Data as
a Smart City initiative. Open Data is data that can be
freely used, shared and built-on by anyone,
anywhere, for any purpose. [4] For example, the
Open Data Institute is centered on the mantra that,
“An Open Data culture creates better cities for
everyone.” [5] In contrast, some view self-interest as
a key reason for the importance of encouraging
business ownership in many contexts including Smart
Cities; business owners have a significant vested
interest in ensuring a system is successful [6]. There
is an important tension related to whether Open Data
or a more traditional data ownership paradigm will
foster more innovation in Smart Cities [e.g., 7]. Many
tout Open Data as a means to stimulate entrepreneurs,
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programmers, sustainability, transportation and
healthcare experts, data scientists and others to identify
solutions to urban issues. Open Data improves
transparency, accountability and it encourages citizen
participation. On the other hand, there can be issues if
data is not well understood, managed improperly
and/or used inappropriately in designing and deploying
advanced analytics. Similarly, there are issues of
security and privacy in Open Data Smart City contexts.
Finally, Smart City innovations in complex verticals
are seen as more likely to be motivated through
proprietary structures, e.g., innovations in the traffic
engineering and healthcare delivery disciplines will
likely occur separately and under different ownership
structures.
Many believe that a hybrid, parastatal model is
applicable to managing fog computing platforms in
Smart Cities. A parastatal is an entity that is owned
wholly or partially by a government. Urbanization,
infrastructure, and technology are aligned in smart
cities, and a variety of parastatals have emerged [e.g.,
8]
1. Songdo International Business District in South
Korea is chartered by the municipality of Incheon,
but the largest shareholder is an American
commercial developer
2. The Skolkovo district of Russia is entirely
government owned
3. The Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor includes 8
smart cities and is funded through a public-private
partnership model
Because fog computing platforms for Smart Cities
are and will likely continue to include the hybrid
model, there is increasing need for legal instruments to
foster partnerships among business, government and
parastatal entities in order to achieve innovation [9].
The remainder of this paper deals with contracting
issues in this business-to-business-to-government
(B2B2G) context. First, we examine contract theory
with an eye towards Smart City services that leverage
data and analytics in deployments on fog computing
platforms that are linked to cloud computing
environments. We define the major issues that
contracts need to address in this context. We then
discuss our methodology and an example experiment.
Through multiple experiments, we found important
results intended to guide contract decision making
from different stakeholders’ perspectives. We conclude
with a discussion of needed future work.

2. Nature of B2B2G Contracting for Smart
City Fog Computing Platforms

There are four paradigms for fog computing
platforms designed to deliver Smart City services: 1)
Enabler, 2) Neutral, 3) System Integrator and 4)
Broker. Walravens and Ballon differentiate the four
on the basis of whether a single entity controls the
assets in the platform and whether that entity has
control over the customer relationships [10]. In this
context, we can consider the owner as a government
or a parastatal. An enabler platform is one where the
owner controls the assets but does not have control
over the customers. The neutral platform is one
where the owner is heavily dependent on the assets of
the other actors to achieve Smart City ideals and does
not control the customer relationship. The system
integrator platform is one where the owner controls
many of the assets, the owner establishes a
relationship with end-users, and external, third-party
service provider engagement is encouraged. In the
broker platform, the owner is dependent on the assets
of others but doesn’t control the customer
relationship. These paradigms can be extended by
considering the data assets that are created when a
Smart City fog computing platform executes, and
considerable data ingestion at service delivery
endpoints ensues. When data is ingested, its
ownership rights can inherit properties from the
paradigm under which the platform is organized. For
example, in the neutral platform, the data ingested
might be owned by the third-party partner who also
owns the relationship with the customer. Private
parties may have proprietary rights to the data
collected as part of their engagement in the fog
platform. Similarly, in the broker platform, the data
ingested at endpoints delivering services that are
under control of the owner may also be the property
of a third-party, but the owner may have to negotiate
and enter into a broker contract for data ownership
rights since external data and infrastructure provided
by a third party enables the service. In these and
many other Smart City scenarios, there are complex
issues of data ownership that need to be reconciled
through contracts.
In addition to data ownership contract
considerations, the analytical models that can be
created through data mining can also be subject to
negotiated ownership rights, and this process is
similarly complex. For example, a predictive model
that is derived from data that is co-owned may inherit
ownership rights from the data co-ownership contract
agreement. Consider also that a predictive model
deployed to deliver a personalized service at an
endpoint that, when executed, may well result in
additional data ingestion. This newly ingested data
can be thought of as being influenced by a predictive
model that is co-owned, so should that subsequently
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ingested data be similarly co-owned by the predictive
model owners?
In general, data and analytics
ownership should be contracted for separately, but
their ownership can be intertwined. It is important for
data and analytics contracts for Smart City fog
platforms to take this complexity into account when
detailing contract terms.
However, it not always
possible to envision any and all possibilities for a
Smart City initiative, so contracts aren’t often allencompassing.
Grossman and Hart and Hart and Moore define
ownership as the, “residual right to control access to an
asset.” [11, 12] In using the term residual, this
definition implies that some rights can be assigned to
others using what is referred to as an incomplete
contract. The rights not assigned are residual rights in
the Grossman and Hart and Hart and Moore approach.
The reason that a contract might be incomplete is that
its clauses, provisions, conditions and terms may not
cover all actions and payments for every possible
contingency that might arise.
In the theory of
incomplete contracts, there is an important concern
called the hold-up problem. This problem occurs when
parties must make non-contractible relationshipspecific investments before a transaction takes place.
For example, building a Smart City fog computing
platform might require third-party investment in
infrastructure assets before any services can be
deployed and revenue can be realized. The hold-up
problem manifests in the fact that the third-party
underinvests because the return may be greater if there
can be renegotiation at a later time – e.g., the thirdparty sees the situation as a multi-stage game whereby
more value may be extracted by a later renegotiation.
Incomplete contract theory stipulates mechanisms for
mitigating the hold-up problem. A basic solution is to
make a contract as complete as possible and to limit
renegotiation at a later date. To this end, we have
developed a Smart City services system model that
aids in articulating terms for Smart City contracts. Our
focus is on the data and analytics ownership issues.

3. A Smart City Multitenant System Model
A Smart City fog computing infrastructure linked to
a cloud computing environment needs to be capable of
integrating multiple initiatives simultaneously. This is
consistent with a multitenant architectural approach.
(Note: Some Smart City infrastructures may be multiinstance; our focus is on multitenant environments.)
For example, there may be traffic applications and
healthcare applications deployed concomitantly.
Therefore, a Smart City platform owner needs to
configure infrastructure for different initiatives in order

to make optimal use of resources. In this way, there
is support for initiatives that come and go, there are
ways to support solution refinement and
redeployment, new initiatives can built on top of
successful predecessors and some initiatives might
provide more value than others in delivering the same
service so some die while others are scaled up. The
swapping in and out of instances of Smart City
services needs to be efficient, and the overall
management of the platform requires a global
management viewpoint for the owner(s).
We consider a Smart City service initiative as
involving three major abstractions: 1) A set of Hosts:
H = {H1, H2, ... Hp}, 2) A set of Smart Object Hosts:
SOH = {SOH1, SOH2, ... SOHq}, and 3) A set of
Smart Objects: SOSOHi = {SOSOHi,1, SOSOHi,2, …
SOSOHi,m}. Smart Objects are located at endpoints
where services are delivered and data is optionally
digested. Smart Objects are associated with a sensor
cluster owner or hub, i.e., a Smart Object Host. For
each Smart Object, we assume it has a set of Senses:
S = {SSOi,1, SSOi,2, ... SSOi,n}. A sense can be a
capability to ingest a data item (e.g., decibel level,
temperature, etc.) and/or it can be an output
capability (e.g., a noise, a coupon, a text message,
etc.). Note that we refer to the endpoints as smart to
imply they are capable of short-term data storage and
they can execute an analytical model that may take
sense values as inputs and produce sense values as
outputs. We consider an analytical model (or simply
an analytic) as being deployed by a Host through a
Smart Object Host to a Smart Object. We describe
an analytic as a function of a subset of the senses that
a Smart Object is capable of, and the output of the
model is also a sense that a Smart Object is capable
of. In short, there can be a set of Analytical Models
(AM) deployed by some Smart Object Host, SOHj at
the direction of a Host Hi or a Smart Object Host,
SOHj to some Smart Object, SOSOHj,q, such that
AM(f(Subset(SOSOHj,q,Sa, SOSOHj,q,Sb, ... SOSOHj,q,St))
-> (Subset(SOSOHj,q,Sa, SOSOHj,q,Sb, ... SOSOHj,q,St)).
A brief example can help to clarify the notations
and the intent of the Smart City initiative service
system model. Consider an Intel AIM Suite® video
sign kiosk that can display a video while at the same
time it can monitor the demographics of those who
are watching the video [13]. Let’s assume that the
video signage kiosk is located just outside all store
entrances in a particular district of a smart city.
Further, assume that a district’s single proprietor has
purchased the video signage kiosks as a perk for
stores that rent space in the district. Now, the Smart
Object Host can be thought of as the district
proprietor. The video sign kiosks can be thought of
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as Smart Objects. The store owners may be thought of
as the Hosts.
To put the service system into motion (Figure 1),
consider that the video sign kiosk can display videos
from suppliers to the store that help to advertise the
products the store is selling. We can therefore also
consider the suppliers as Hosts. When the district’s
stores are open and people walk around, a kiosk may
be displaying a video and capturing demographics of a
person who is watching intently. That kiosk has
analytical models that enable examining the skull and
body structure of a viewer to determine gender, age
range, the viewing time and the distance from the
kiosk. Further, suppose the kiosk can deploy analytical
models sent to it by the stores. For example, Macy’s
may opt for the kiosk to send a coupon in a text
message to a viewer who has watched a certain video
for a certain length of time. Similarly, a supplier may
have an analytical model at the kiosk that extends an
up-sell offer for a viewer who showed interest in a
swim suit ad that provides incentives to purchase a
matching cover-up.
When data is ingested at the
kiosk, the analytical models use their senses to evaluate
if the model is relevant, and if so, the kiosk’s other
senses enable it to send a text message (if permitted by
the viewer). The data in the overall system includes
the demographics of the viewer, the time spent
watching the video, the state of how many kiosks had
active viewers at a point in time in the district, the
demographics of those issued texted coupons, whether
a purchase was made with the coupon, etc. To further
complicate matters, the store owners may be collecting
data on sales to determine the most effective campaign
models, so it can do data mining to build a new
analytical model for deployment to relevant kiosks.
H

AM

SOH
AM*
AM**

SO
H

participants, data ownership is open to contract
negotiation between the parties, and the dynamics of
the service system require consideration of a variety
of scenarios and extended possibilities when deciding
on contract terms.
In fact, Federal Trade
Commission Chairwoman Edith Rameriz cited Intel’s
AIM Suite as indicative of the privacy and security
concerns for Smart City fog platforms. [14] In
relation to the responsibility for privacy and security,
there are many questions in terms of this scenario
about ownership such as:
1. Who owns the demographic data collected at the
kiosk – the district proprietor, the store, the
supplier who provided the video? All of the
parties?
2. How should ingested data co-ownership be
determined? For example, should store owners
be required to allow others to co-own data on the
number of purchases (and dollar values) that
resulted from the issuance of a coupon?
3. Who owns the predictive models that are
constructed from data that might be co-owned?
4. Who owns the data that is collected after an
analytical model is deployed that might impact
the behavior of the service system as a whole?
5. If a store owner closes up, how will ownership
structure be impacted?
Natural extensions to the system model include the
situation where more than one Host is contracting
with a single Smart Object Host, Smart Objects are
co-owned, owned data by a party who exits should be
deleted (or is allowed to persist if co-owned), etc. In
the following section, the issues related to contract
terms are summarized with respect to the Smart City
multitenant system model and the example scenario
above.

Applies AM
Data Item

4. Data and Analytics Ownership
Contract Provision Options

SOH

ü A Host sends an Analy-cal Model to a Smart Object Host, and the Smart Object Host
deploys it to a Smart Object (at the edge)
ü The Smart Object is always on, gathers data through its senses and if the analy-cal
model is applied based on the data collected, the Smart Object does as the model
dictates by responding through its senses
ü Data items are con-nuously generated and collected by the Smart Objects
ü A Host can query a Smart Object for data and use that data to construct a new
Analy-cal Model* that is deployed through a Smart Object Host to a Smart Object
ü Similarly, a Smart Object Host can query a smart object for data and use that data to
construct a new Analy-cal Model** that is deployed through a Smart Object Host (or
itself) to a Smart Object

Figure 1: Sample dynamic flow
What’s clear from the example above is that it can
get extremely complex very quickly regarding what
entities own which data and analytical models. This
example is rich in the sense that there are multiple

Contract provisions addressing ownership and
other related characteristics can potentially influence
the design and operations of Smart City fog
platforms. In the following, we discuss six contract
provision options. Several options pertain to contract
provisions involving data and analytical model
ownership.
Fixed-price vs. Value-based contracts: In fixedbased contracts, the parties agree on some unit of
analysis upon which service fees will be assessed.
For example, the messaging between H and SOH
may be billed on a per-message basis or on the basis
of the time duration of a contract. In contrast, valuebased contracts refer to a division between the parties
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of, for example, the total profit generated by partnering
stakeholders. For example, if there is a profit from a
partnership of H and SOH stakeholders in a Smart City
fog platform, then contract provisions will specify how
the profit is to be divided between stakeholders.
Data Exclusivity vs. Non-Exclusivity: When data
ownership is exclusive, there is a specific entity that
owns the data. For example, a contract may stipulate
that an SOH owns all the data generated by the SOs
connected to it. Data is co-owned or open when
contract provisions stipulate that data is non-exclusive.
Analytical Model Exclusivity vs. Non-Exclusivity:
An analytical model is owned by the entity responsible
for its creation if an exclusivity provision is included in
a contract. In addition, only the creator of the analytic
is allowed to modify it. When an AM is nonexclusive, then it is co-owned or open. Any of the coowners can modify the analytic.
Co-mingling vs. No Co-mingling: In co-mingling,
an analytical model created or derived through data
that is co-owned is thereby co-owned by the same
entities who co-own the data. If there is no comingling, the entity that creates the model owns the
model exclusively.
Data post-use vs. No data post-use: If data post-use
is a contract provision, then if a data owner leaves a
partnership governed by a contract, the data that entity
owns becomes the property of the remaining owner(s).
If there is no data post-use contract clause, the data
solely owned by an exiting owner is deleted.
Analytical model post-use vs. No analytical model
post-use: If an analytical model post-use provision is
included in a contract, then an analytical model
owned/co-owned by a exiting partner remains the
property of the remaining owner(s). If there is no
analytical model post-use, then an analytical model
solely owned by an exiting owner is deleted.
Note that the contract provisions above may all exist
at the same time in Smart City fog platform contracts.
In the course of the life of such a fog platform,
contracts will change between parties, parties
themselves may come and go, and data and analytical
models may constantly evolve.

5. Methodology
We view an instance of a multitenant smart city fog
platform with a set of participating organizations and a
platform owner(s) as a complex system. Such a system
exhibits dynamism in the sense that new participants
may join over time, some participants leave,
participants can enter into contracts with each other
and then dynamically change the provisions of those
contracts, and new IoT hardware and software can be
deployed and/or removed. All of these changes can

occur quickly, simultaneously and in isolation of
other changes that may be taking place in the
platform. For these types of systems, a research
methodology relying on complex adaptive system
theory has been found relevant [e.g., 15, 16]. Given
the dynamics of smart city fog platforms, it follows
that there is no single governing equation or rule that
controls the system.
Instead, there are many
interacting parts with little central control. There is
an unpredictable future trajectory of a multitenant fog
computing platform given the nonlinear variety of
changes and evolutions it may go through. The fog
platform changes and adapts in accordance with
changes that occur from one snapshot to the next. It
is akin to a moving target with continuously changing
equilibrium states.
Using a complex adaptive systems research
methodology typically requires construction of a
system simulator that allows the researcher to
conduct experiments by manipulating control
variables, observing behavior and modifying
variables to derive new conclusions. While it may be
straightforward to define the rules of behavior for
participants in a complex system, it is not obvious
what patterns might emerge when individual
participants follow those rules over time. Thus as a
complex system adapts, patterns may or may not
emerge that provide evidence of the holistic behavior
of the system.
In the case of data and analytics ownership
contracts, a complex adaptive systems methodology
will
necessarily
involve
experimentation,
observation of emerging patterns, variable
manipulation and additional experimentation. The
following section describes an example experiment.

6. Example Experiment
Consistent with the complex adaptive systems
methodology, we constructed a simulator that
elaborates the fog platform abstractions of Section
3’s Smart City system model. The simulator supports
experimental observance of fog platform executions
by facilitating manipulations of a large number of
variables. It also supports the establishment of
different sets of dependent and independent variables.
For example, the simulator supports varying the
topologies created for a specific Smart City initiative
abstraction. Topology can described in terms of the
Hosts (H), Smart Object Hosts (SOH) and Smart
Objects (SO). A particular topology might start with
a stochastically generated number (within a given
distribution) of H, SOH and SO entities. Each
topology forms a graph with edges connecting
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different H entities with SOH entities to indicate there
is a contract for engaging in a Smart City initiative.
SO entities are connected to SOH entities to indicate an
ownership relationship, i.e., an SOH owns an SO. A
topology usually has a larger number of smart objects
(SO) than it has smart object hosts (SOH). For
example, there may be many stores (following the Intel
AIM Suite scenario, above) – or many Hs. There may
be one district proprietor (SOH) who purchased all of
the kiosks (SOs) to place throughout the district. Since
there are kiosks (SOs) at each store in the district, the
topology is a graph connecting H to SOH and SOH to
each of the SOs. Note that if the number of SOs is
larger than the number of SOHs, then the topology
indicates that there are many owners for each SO.
Other variables include the number of scripts that are
executed in a single simulator run, and there is a
variable for managing the total number of simulator
runs for a particular experiment. Actions in a script
might include adding or deleting hosts (Hs), adding or
deleting smart object hosts (SOHs), adding or deleting
smart objects (SOs), adding or deleting analytical
models (AMs), etc. Scripts are simulations of events
that occur in the Smart City service system, and they
are serially executed primitive operations within the
simulator. Scripts have actions that are stochastically
determined. In the experiment described below, many
of the independent variables are manipulated while two
dependent variables are observed:
in-fog
communication cost and fog-to-cloud communication
cost. Table One lists the variables included in the
current version of the simulator.
Topology (Number of H, SOH an SO entities and the
contract/ownership links between them)
In-fog messaging and data access costs
Fog-to-Cloud messaging and data access costs
Number of scripts executed per simulator run
Count of topology simulations for a given topology in a run
Number of Hs added or deleted in a run (add and delete scripts are
randomly generated according to a given distribution)
Number of SOHs added or deleted in a run (add or delete scripts
are randomly generated in a run according to a given distribution)
Number of SOs added or deleted in a run (add or delete scripts are
randomly generated in a run according to a given distribution)
Number of Analytical Models (AMs) added, deleted or updated in
run
Contract Type: Fixed (flat fees for a level of service) vs. Value
(parties share in value that the relationship generates)

Table One: Simulator variables
The main benefit of the simulator is that it can be
configured to examine a particular contract type. For
example, selecting from the provision options in
Section 4, above yields a contract instance. At this
point, the simulator is constructed such that all of the
dyads in a particular topology agree to the same
contract (e.g., all H and SOH entities in a topology

agree to a common set of contract provisions). In
other words, all H to SOH contract provisions are
fixed for a run. A run means the simulator will:
REPEAT 1) Generate a topology, 2) REPEAT 3)
Generate a script, 4) Serially execute the script and
accumulate the in-fog communication costs and the
fog-to-cloud communication costs (currently counted
as a cost of 1 per link followed in the topology),
UNTIL the required number of scripts are generated,
UNTIL the number of topologies generated are
robust enough to draw general conclusions from the
run.
In-fog communication costs are those related to
sending messages from SOH to SO (and vice-versa)
to reflect the actions required in executing a script.
In contrast, H to SOH communications are from the
cloud (where the datacenters belonging to each H are
presumed to exist) to SOHs and from SOHs (in the
fog) to Hs (in the cloud), i.e., cloud-to-fog and fogto-cloud – we refer to both cases as fog-to-cloud) to
reflect the actions required in executing a script. We
modeled the databases stored at Hs, SOHs and SOs –
and the database model remains consistent across
cases investigated in the following experiment.
In this experiment, we considered two specific sets
of contract provisions consistent with the discussion
in Section 1, above, regarding tensions between open
and more proprietary Smart City services’ fog
computing platform initiatives. We assume the
context is one where all parties are entered into the
same fixed-based contracts for each case examined
using the simulator.
Case 1: The first case we investigate assumes
analytical model exclusivity, open data, no comingling, no analytical model post-use. Basically,
this context is one where the ideals of open data
proponents enable entrepreneurs to create new
services (via proprietary analytical models) that will
generate revenue for innovators, but where all data
remains open - yet upon exit, an entrepreneurial
partner can remove owned analytical models from the
fog computing platform.
Case 2: The second case we investigate assumes
analytical model non-exclusivity, open data, comingling, and analytical model post-use. In this
scenario, there is an even more open environment
assumption since analytical models have shared
ownership and all data is open.
To examine differences using the simulator, we
established distributions for generating random
topologies. Basically, we used the same distributions
for Hs and SOHs, but we increased the size of the SO
distributions to reflect that there will likely be many
sensors associated with a Smart City initiative:
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H/SOH Distributions
Low: 5 to 50
Medium: 51 to 200
High: 201 to 500

SO Distributions
Low: 10 to 100
Medium:101 to 500
High: 501 to 1000

We refer to the topologies generated in the following
by using a three letter acronym associated with
abbreviations of Low, Medium and High.
For
example, the abbreviation LLL implies a topology
where the number of Hs is low, the number of SOHs is
low and the number of SOs is low. In this way, we
ensured we could observe that a simulator run
produced sufficient observations for each topology for
a varying number of scripts. We varied the number of
scripts in a similar low, medium and high manner. The
low number of scripts is 20, the medium is 50 and the
high is 100. The intent is to use the simulator to
examine a robust mix of scripts as well as a robust set
of topologies.
For Case 1 with 100 scripts, Table 2 shows the
results of the simulator. Note that in Case 1, there are
considerably more in-fog costs than fog-to-cloud costs
for all topologies. This finding was consistent across
the 20 and 50 script size runs. Table 3 shows
information about the variables we sought to keep
consistent across all runs and script executions in order
to isolate the in-fog and fog-to-cloud cost variations
only. The small standard deviations of the means
across runs are indicative that these variables were kept
within suitable range.

Topology
LLL
LLM
LLH
LML
LMM
LMH
LHL
LHM
LHH
MLL
MLM
MLH
MML
MMM
MMH
MHL
MHM
MHH
HLL
HLM
HLH
HML
HMM
HMH
HHL
HHM
HHH

In-Fog Costs Fog-to-Cloud Costs Count
1,418,901,602.00
1,322,350.38
293
1,538,680,994.00
1,432,207.60
266
1,614,220,422.00
1,502,766.21
225
1,470,203,498.00
1,368,115.69
236
1,582,192,066.00
1,472,875.60
276
1,613,721,673.00
1,502,277.50
233
1,638,695,953.00
1,544,229.20
245
1,620,924,447.00
1,507,126.10
272
1,569,527,453.00
1,460,256.30
190
1,578,840,869.00
1,469,341.75
258
1,641,345,498.00
1,526,573.50
249
1,583,851,551.00
1,472,606.90
210
1,680,872,818.00
1,563,652.80
229
1,668,962,464.00
1,552,893.90
234
1,486,440,631.00
1,383,571.07
173
1,546,653,065.00
1,440,613.29
259
1,506,906,948.00
1,401,363.67
242
1,564,982,110.00
1,456,073.47
194
1,577,668,984.00
1,468,729.05
265
1,582,113,627.00
1,472,909.88
275
1,636,453,909.00
1,522,136.13
199
1,572,133,471.00
1,463,513.17
265
1,701,662,490.00
1,582,938.81
241
1,533,345,334.00
1,427,737.19
182
1,574,900,090.00
1,765,919.21
235
1,578,362,780.00
1,468,635.34
234
1,726,634,953.00
1,603,335.39
158

Table 2: Case 1 - 100 scripts – dependent
variables
CASE 1
Avg #H added
Avg #H deleted
Avg #SOH added
Avg #SOH deleted
Avg #SO deleted
Avg AM added
Avg AM deleted

20 Scripts

50 Scripts

100 Scripts

Mean Of Mean SD Of Mean Mean Of Mean SD Of Mean Mean Of Mean SD Of Mean
9,795
313
17,572
626
49,666
2,159
9,779
317
17,565
629
49,961
2,170
9,808
324
17,514
625
49,758
2,172
19,519
631
34,820
1,244
98,398
4,280
9,762
307
17,403
622
50,048
2,174
3,224
104
5,815
209
16,694
723
3,217
91
5,812
210
16,694
723

Table 3: Case 1 – 100 scripts – control variables
For Case 2 with 100 scripts, the results of the
simulator are shown in Table 4. Compared to case 1,
the Fog-to-Cloud costs are substantially higher, but
the in-fog costs are fairly consistent. This appears to
be a surprising result since Case 2 is presumably a
more open Smart City context than Case 1 –
analytical models are non-exclusive, data is open,
there is no Post-use limitation. Why would the fog to
cloud costs be so substantially higher for a more open
environment when contrasted with a more
proprietary, closed environment? Note that the
reason isn’t due to some variation in the control
variables for Case 2 as shown in Table 6. The
standard deviations are quite low.
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Topology
LLL
LLM
LLH
LML
LMM
LMH
LHL
LHM
LHH
MLL
MLM
MLH
MML
MMM
MMH
MHL
MHM
MHH
HLL
HLM
HLH
HML
HMM
HMH
HHL
HHM
HHH

In-Fog Costs Fog-to-Cloud Costs Count
1,435,689,941.53
61,961,562.09
303
1,515,670,584.67
65,384,928.09
278
1,481,367,365.68
63,936,550.59
235
1,480,691,085.18
63,884,041.67
256
1,579,861,442.77
68,132,964.47
249
1,494,748,210.50
64,503,463.77
242
1,575,744,830.25
67,943,358.97
280
1,477,016,530.93
63,716,149.85
260
1,472,672,706.10
63,557,916.19
185
1,447,297,831.08
62,473,617.45
264
1,508,190,762.60
65,002,924.60
258
1,482,376,442.15
63,962,473.70
232
1,448,178,701.00
62,496,678.75
237
1,451,499,536.20
62,636,967.48
241
1,634,016,700.78
70,418,365.52
201
1,555,942,572.18
67,080,782.60
224
1,631,792,201.34
70,381,041.20
209
1,491,970,865.30
64,354,923.21
200
1,548,963,157.15
66,825,366.92
253
1,522,050,702.91
65,625,290.48
227
1,369,411,272.57
59,118,090.50
174
1,449,491,552.14
62,542,104.78
230
1,414,640,491.44
61,042,665.31
232
1,538,028,657.29
66,301,070.94
178
1,531,807,089.06
66,090,009.35
234
1,477,779,161.17
63,756,352.70
220
1,564,282,284.76
67,447,879.74
176

Table 4: Case 1 - 100 scripts – dependent
variables
CASE 2
Avg #H added
Avg #H deleted
Avg #SOH added
Avg #SOH deleted
Avg #SO added
Avg #SO deleted
Avg AM added
Avg AM deleted

20 Scripts

50 Scripts

100 Scripts

Mean Of Mean SD Of Mean Mean Of Mean SD Of Mean Mean Of Mean SD Of Mean
8,866
386
22,470
941
45,527
1,448
9,008
386
22,567
946
45,025
1,438
8,790
381
22,402
942
45,086
1,448
17,697
763
44,646
1,877
89,071
2,861
8,888
388
22,506
949
45,122
1,448
8,798
385
22,703
945
45,302
1,452
2,963
128
7,531
316
15,049
480
2,963
128
7,531
316
15,049
480

Table 5: Case 1 – 100 scripts – control variables
We find that the reason Case 2 requires more fog-tocloud communication is because that in order to have
non-exclusive analytical models, there is a need to
communicate all model changes to Hosts. In other
words, the open environment in this experiment leads
to a high cost for fog-to-cloud communication.
Democratization of analytics and models comes at a
cost.

7. Overall Findings
Table 6 summarizes findings from thousands of
experiments that we conducted. These can be viewed
as starting points for elaborating more sophisticated
decision models by applying actual smart city
infrastructure cost estimates and other financial
parameters. For findings I - IX, the contract type

assumption for the finding is given. Next, the
contract’s provision and the perspective relevant to
the finding are stated. Timing refers to when a
participant may opt to enter into the smart city
dynamic, and partnering refers to the nature of the
relationships among stakeholders. Finally, findings
are shown relevant to the given scenario.
Row I refers to the experiment discussed in section
6 of this paper. Here, the contract was fixed, data
and analytics are open, and the perspective is from
the vantage point of the smart city fog platform
owner. Timing doesn’t matter in this case, and the
partnering relationship is one of open sharing. The
important finding here is that the platform owner will
need an infrastructure with a larger capacity, all other
things being equal, in contrast to an architecture
where there contract provisions are proprietary.
Democratization of analytics and data comes at a cost
to the infrastructure owner.
In Row II, taken from a participant’s perspective,
if the partner is an early entrant into the smart city
infrastructure, and that participant sustains for a
relatively long period of time, then under the data
post-use paradigm, that participant can anticipate coowning a large percentage of the fog platforms
ingested data during that time period. In fact, the
average across thousands of simulation runs was that
the participant would co-own 73% of that ingested
data.
Row III is similar to the case of Row II, however,
here we found that an early entrant in a data post-use
contracting environment that partners with a another
early entrant that operates in a complementary area
can together co-own even more data than in the
scenario of Row II. In Row IV, we consider the
scenario where there are no data post-use contract
provisions. In this scenario, a participant should not
exchange any value for a post-use contract with
another participant because the data ingested into the
whole system will likely be fairly quickly flushed.
The scenario of Row V. is similar – it indicates that
trying to negotiate for data post-use in a fog platform
instance where no other parties are sharing data postuse is not a good option.
In scenario VI, we consider a late entrant who may
target a long-term, early entrant with a data sharing
agreement, and we find the late entrant can indeed
benefit from that relationship. In this scenario, if the
late entrant picks the correct partner, the averages we
observed were that 50% of the fog platforms ingested
data may well be shared.
Scenario VII addresses the context where
participants have exited in an environment
characterized by data non-exclusivity and analytic
post-use. The fog platform owner will require some
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sort of garbage collection mechanism that executes on
a regular basis in order to avoid unnecessary
infrastructure costs.
In Row VIII, where there are analytics co-mingling
and data non-exclusivity, predictive model updates can
become an issue. We observed highly bi-modal
distributions in communication and coordination costs
for predictive model updates. In instances where
update latency is significant, it will be very important
to have large communication pipes.
Finally, in Row IX, we found throughout our
experiments that early performance results were not
reliable; the simulation almost always took significant
time to stabilize. This means that fog platform owner
should not rely too much on early system performance
results in taking measures to improve the infrastructure
performance.

8. Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to investigate
organizational data and analytics contracting in smart
city fog platforms. We identified and considered
different contract provisions including analytical model
and data co-mingling/no co-mingling, post-use and no
post-use and exclusivity/non-exclusivity. We also
consider fee-based and value-based contract types.
Using complex adaptive systems methods and
extensive experimentation, we identified emergent
patterns that can guide stakeholders negotiating
preferred contract positions. Stakeholders include both
smart city fog platform owners and participants in
these multitenant platforms. Our future work requires
improving the simulator so that multiple contract types
and provisions can be mixed in hybrid contexts rather
than be held consistent for each experiment. In
addition, we plan to consider additional contract
provisions and more real-life scenarios. Finally, we
plan to leverage our simulation results to construct
analytical models that include financial/cost/revenue
detail.
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Simple

Simple

Simple

Simple

Simple or Value

Simple or Value

Any

Any

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

Contract Type

Fixed

I.

Any

Smart City Platform
Owner

Smart City Platform
Owner

Smart City Platform
Owner

Participant

Participant

Participant

Participant

Participant

Perspective
Smart City Platform
Owner

Timing

Any

Any

Later

Late Entrant

Doesn’t Matter

Doesn’t Matter

Early Entrant with a
Complementary
Partner

Early Entrant,
Sustaining Stakeholder

All

Any

Case When Most Partners
Co-Mingle Analytics

Partnering with an Early,
Sustaining Stakeholder that
has Used Non-Exclusive Data
and Analytics with CoMingling
Case When Partners Have
Exited

One Party Wants Data and
Analytics Post-Use, but No
Others Do

No Data and Analytics PostUse

Post-Use Contract with
Complementary Partner

All Partners enter contracts
with post-use provisions

Partnering
All Partners Share in
Ownership

Table 6: Summary of Findings from Multiple Experiments

Analytics Co-Mingling,
Data Non-exclusivity

Data Non-Exclusivity and
Analytics Post-Use in
Contract Mix

Data and Analytics
Sharing with Early
Entrant

Data and Analytics Postuse

No Data and Analytics
Post-Use

Data Post-Use

Data Post-Use

Contract’s Provisions
Data and Analytics NonExclusivity, Post-Use

Findings
Open architectures have
higher infrastructure capacity
costs than more proprietary
architectures
An early entrant will co-own
a large amount of the total
ingested data
The two stakeholders will coown an even larger amount
of the total ingested data in
comparison to I., above
Best in Volatile Situations
where Data and Analytics
will be fairly Quickly
Flushed Anyway
Being a hold-out for Data
and Analytics Post-Use
Provides Little Advantage
Unless Contracting With all
Partners Post-use
A late entrant can gain
advantage by partnering with
an early entrant that was
openly sharing data and
analytics
The ecosystem owner must
have a garbage collection
capability for data and
analytics that are no longer
owned by any active partner
There can be bi-modal
volatility in adaptation costs
for predictive model updates;
ensure there are big pipes
and low latency for
communication peaks when
necessary
Infrastructure owners should
not rely on early performance
measures to gauge long term
ecosystem performance

